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Abstract 
 
Watershed scientists frequently describe urbanization as a primary cause of water quality 
degradation, and recent studies conclude that even in lightly-developed watersheds, urbanization 
often precludes attainment of water quality standards. This Article considers legal responses to 
this pervasive problem. It explains why traditional legal measures have been ineffective, and it 
evaluates several recent innovations piloted in the northeastern United States. These innovations 
are potentially applicable across the nation. Specifically, the innovations involve using 
impervious cover total maximum daily loads, residual designation authority, and collective 
permitting to expand, intensify, and modify regulatory control of urban stormwater. More 
generally, the innovations involve transferring regulatory focus from end-of-the-pipe to 
landscape-based controls. The Article concludes that these innovations, while raising some new 
problems, represent a promising shift. It then discusses additional reforms and research needed to 
better reconcile legal water quality standards and traditional land development patterns. It also 
evaluates the federalism implications of this shift, and closes by considering some of the difficult 
prioritization questions raised by urban watershed restoration efforts. 
 
Keywords: Urbanization, water quality, impervious cover, TMDLs, residual designation 
authority, watershed based permitting, federalism  
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Just southwest of Portland, Maine, an inaccurately named little stream called Long Creek flows 
through a typical American landscape.1 Hotels, office buildings, manufacturing plants, part of an 
airport, an interstate, and many smaller roadways lie interspersed within an archipelago of 
shopping malls. The retailers are a familiar group: though some local businesses are present, 
national chains predominate. Despite all the development, Long Creek remains an important 
community resource. Walking trails line its lower reaches,2 it empties into a small pond once 
popular for swimming,3 and it then flows into Casco Bay, still a distinguishing feature of the 
region and a driver of the local economy.4 But Long Creek is polluted, and native aquatic species 
are mostly gone.5 The problem is not the causes traditionally blamed for water quality 
degradation. The watershed contains no industrial outfalls, municipal wastewater treatment 
plants, or farms.6 Instead, Long Creek is polluted because the surrounding landscape, with all of 
its roads, roofs, and parking lots, no longer sustains water quality.7 
 
Nearly forty years ago, Congress enacted legislation intended to protect streams like Long Creek. 
The Clean Water Act8 (“CWA”) requires every state to set water quality standards for rivers, 
lakes, coastal waterways, and streams.9 The states also must identify waters that fail to meet 
those standards, and the Act directs the states to use planning and permitting to ensure that 
degraded waters come into compliance.10 Other environmental laws, like the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”) and a variety of state and local requirements, provide additional protection.11 But 
despite these laws, and notwithstanding some dramatic water quality improvements,12 thousands 
of waterways across the nation still fail to meet water quality standards.13 Problems remain in 
water bodies of all types, but they are particularly prevalent in city, suburban, and suburban-
fringe streams (all of which, for simplicity, this Article just refers to as “urban streams”14). Most, 
if not nearly all, of these streams have poor water quality.15 The consequences are problematic: 
native biodiversity suffers; pollution migrates downstream to lakes, rivers, and the ocean; 
communities lose aesthetic and recreational benefits from some of their most accessible 
waterways; and landowners face substantial financial liabilities.16  
 
This problem is not new; for years, watershed scientists have known the poor condition of urban 
watersheds.17 Nor are scientists ignorant of the underlying causes. While degradation typically 
derives from the combined influence of multiple stressors, a growing body of scientific literature 
implicates stormwater runoff18 from impervious surfaces—roads, parking lots, and roofs, 
primarily—as a key factor in water quality degradation.19 Physical solutions do exist. While 
uncertainty remains about the effectiveness of many measures, researchers have identified a wide 
variety of prevention and mitigation measures.20 Watershed scientists still do not fully 
understand the mechanisms of harm,21 but enough is known to start solving the problem. 
 
Finding a legal fix has proven difficult, however. The CWA’s primary permitting program, the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), has been successful on other 
fronts but has achieved limited progress in controlling stormwater pollution.22 The Act’s backup 
approach—a series of planning and permitting requirements beginning with the development of 
pollution budgets, or “total maximum daily loads” (“TMDLs”)—has done little to address any 
sort of water pollution,23 and faces particularly acute problems when applied to urban 
stormwater.24 Other potential legal remedies, like the Endangered Species Act, state water 
quality laws, and local land use regulations, have helped in some locales but more often have had 
little or no effect.25 All of these regulatory approaches do provide platforms for innovative and 
highly motivated regulators to act, but none has provided a consistent spur to action when state 
and local governments are preoccupied with other priorities, as is often the case. Consequently, 
the water quality problems created by urbanization remain largely unsolved.  
 
That may be starting to change. A variety of regulatory innovations, many within existing 
statutory frameworks, suggest the possibility of an emergent approach to addressing urban 
stormwater pollution.26 This approach would involve dramatically expanding the scope of 
NPDES permitting requirements;27 relying on permitting and funding approaches that allow 
watershed-scale restoration planning;28 and expanding the regulatory focus beyond end-of-the-
pipe controls to increased regulation of development patterns.29 Many of the innovations are in 
their nascent stages, and a fully integrated framework has yet to emerge.30 But, in combination, 
the innovations could create a more effective system for protecting urban water quality. That 
system would focus directly on the relationship between development patterns and 
environmental quality, apply across much of the American landscape, and, importantly, be 
backed by potential federal or citizen enforcement.  
 
With that potential change come questions. Scientists may increasingly recognize links between 
development patterns and water quality, and regulators might respond by integrating local land 
use controls into federally-mandated permitting systems. But political, judicial, and academic 
rhetoric continues to espouse the ideal of local control, with federal environmental law often 
portrayed as a rigid, economically inefficient, overly litigious, and fundamentally anti-
democratic force.31 That rhetoric is particularly prevalent when land use is at issue.32 The 
continued prevalence of these anti-federal views suggests that many powerful lawmakers would 
resist allowing the CWA to constrain land use decisions, particularly if the constraints are 
activated through citizen petitions and lawsuits.  
 
The shift in regulatory focus also raises questions about environmental priorities. Urban 
watershed restoration is expensive,33 and small urban streams, while sometimes important, are 
rarely the signature environmental features that define a community’s sense of identity. 
Scientists and engineers also question the extent to which heavily urbanized watersheds can be 
restored,34 and preventing degradation in lightly urbanized watersheds usually costs much less 
than restoring streams in already built-out areas.35 However, even small watersheds can provide 
significant ecosystem services,36 and pollution can migrate downstream, creating major problems 
in larger and more visible waterways.37 Highly developed watersheds also typically contain 
many people. Even if restoring those streams is particularly difficult, it may be illogical and 
inequitable to allow environmental decay in people’s backyards while protecting more pristine 
but less accessible watersheds.38 But difficult questions remain about the appropriate extent of 
restoration, which watersheds should come first, and what criteria should be used to make such 
judgments. 
 
This Article uses the story of Long Creek, and more generally the troubles of small urban 
watersheds, to explore these questions. But none of these issues are unique to this one little 
stream, or even to water quality management. In multiple ways, Long Creek offers a window 
into the contemporary challenges of environmental protection. Like Long Creek’s pollution, 
many environmental problems derive from the cumulative effects of many small stressors, and 
the challenges of regulating such incremental harms therefore recur throughout environmental 
law.39 Similar federalism problems are endemic; from air quality management to endangered 
species protection, locally-determined development patterns routinely create tension with federal 
environmental mandates.40 And urban watershed protection raises foundational questions—most 
hotly debated but largely unresolved—about how to value environmental resources, and how to 
reconcile those values with the inevitability of some human alteration of natural systems.41 The 
list easily could go on.42 While this Article does not purport to resolve any of those debates, its 
discussion of small urban watersheds holds relevance for all of them.  
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the mechanisms of degradation of urban 
streams and then explains why the existing legal regime has accomplished little. Part III 
discusses emerging regulatory efforts to address urban watershed protection, focusing on several 
recent initiatives in the northeastern United States. To date, those efforts have largely occurred 
piecemeal, but they could and should become interconnected within a broader, integrated effort 
aimed at increasing regulatory focus on landscape patterns. Part IV focuses on federalism, and 
concludes that, in this context, the standard rhetoric is overly simplistic and not particularly 
constructive. This rhetoric overlooks the unavoidable interrelationships between land use 
patterns and environmental quality43 and rests on dubious assumptions about the necessary 
preconditions for effective, innovative governance—which, of course, is what federalism 
ultimately is supposed to promote.  
 
Part V addresses challenges of prioritization. I map out key issues, including some concerns 
about the approaches to prioritization suggested by current non-legal literature, and close with 
suggestions for regulatory reform and future interdisciplinary research.44 The suggested reform, 
in a nutshell, is that under limited circumstances, the Environmental Protection Agency (the 
“EPA”) should allow states to relax water quality standards for highly urbanized watersheds, but 
only when that relaxation is balanced by several state commitments, including a strong and 
readily enforceable program to address the water quality impact of urbanization across the rest of 
the landscape.  
 
I. URBANIZATION, DEGRADATION, AND THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL 
REGULATION 
 
To understand why urban water pollution poses a persistent legal challenge, one must first 
understand something about the mechanisms of degradation. This section therefore briefly45 
explains the underlying biophysical causes of degradation and then discusses why traditional 
legal mechanisms have not effectively addressed those causes. 
 
A. “Urban Stream Syndrome”46 
 Urbanized watersheds typically have very different hydrology from undeveloped watersheds. In 
the latter, some precipitation does not reach the ground and instead remains on leaves, branches, 
or grass.47 The rest typically lands on porous surfaces—either partly decayed leaves and duff or 
in meadows with matted layers of live and dead grass—which allow infiltration into the ground 
but impede surface flow.48 Once in the ground, some water is absorbed into root systems and 
transpired by plants, some remains as soil moisture, and the rest percolates downward to the 
water table.49 It then flows laterally, usually at a very slow rate, until it discharges to surface 
waters.50 Only in larger storm events, when the rate of precipitation exceeds the ground’s 
capacity for infiltration or on landscapes with abundant bedrock or hard-packed soils, does 
precipitation produce significant quantities of surface runoff.51 
 
In several ways, that natural flow regime supports surface water quality. While surface flows 
tend to warm or cool to ambient surface temperatures, which vary widely over seasons and even 
days, subsurface conditions vary little, and streams recharged primarily by groundwater flow 
therefore have relatively stable temperatures.52 Shade vegetation creates a similar moderating 
effect, and trees also promote habitat diversity when they fall into waterways.53 An undeveloped 
landscape usually contains few pollutant sources, and some of the pollution carried with 
precipitation or deposited on the land surface filters out as water moves through the ground.54 
And in undeveloped landscapes, waterways are directly connected to surrounding riparian and 
upland habitat, allowing species to move between habitat zones as they forage, shelter, and 
breed.55 For all of these reasons, the quality of waterways flowing through undeveloped 
landscapes tends to be quite high.  
 Urbanization introduces a series of detrimental changes to that hydrology.56 Human development 
almost invariably increases the extent of impervious surfaces—pavement and roofs, most 
importantly, but also compacted soils57—which stop water from infiltrating the ground and force 
it to flow overland, usually to a system of storm drains and sometimes directly to receiving 
waters.58 Because these overland flows move much faster than groundwater, more water reaches 
streams during and shortly after rainstorms, which increases, often dramatically, the frequency 
and intensity of high flows.59 Meanwhile, groundwater flows diminish, and less water flows into 
streams between storm events.60 Water extractions can exacerbate this effect; lawns and 
landscaped vegetation usually require irrigation, which can increase pumping from aquifers 
already depleted by reductions in recharge.61 Consequently, urbanized watersheds frequently 
experience “flashy” flow, with higher flows, and often even floods, during storm events and 
lower or non-existent flows in dry periods.62 
 
For a variety of reasons, the composition of urban runoff also differs from runoff in undeveloped 
areas.63 Urbanization adds many pollutants: lawn fertilizers and pesticides; oil and grease from 
cars and machinery; heavy metals scraped from brake pads and tires; salts from snow and ice 
treatment; sediment from construction sites; and aromatic hydrocarbons from fuel combustion, 
among others.64 Loading of most of these pollutants increases in proportion to the area of 
impervious surfaces.65 Other pollutants, like animal feces or atmospherically deposited nitrogen 
or mercury, occur in both urban and undeveloped areas but are more easily washed into surface 
waters where impervious surfaces are present.66 Temperatures67 also change; urban landscapes 
often warm and sometimes cool runoff, leading to both greater temperature variability than in 
undeveloped landscapes and greater stress for many aquatic species.68 Often these pollutants 
arrive in pulses, particularly when rain falls after extended dry periods or, in colder regions, 
when snow melts.69 In watersheds with combined sewers,70 the pulses are particularly 
pronounced; runoff from small storm events may be treated, but larger storms can overflow 
treatment systems and discharge mixtures of untreated stormwater and raw sewage.71 
 
Urbanization also changes the physical structure of streams. With development, streams are often 
channelized, routed through culverts and dams, or even buried.72 Development often displaces 
riparian habitat, severing connections between streams and the surrounding habitat and removing 
shade vegetation. The loss of riparian vegetation limits the influx of large woody debris, which 
provides important habitat in healthy streams.73 Flow changes also affect the physical shape of 
streambeds. High flows tend to be erosive, and flashy flows will often widen and deepen a 
stream’s bed.74 Habitat diversity typically diminishes, with riffles, pools, and bends replaced by a 
straighter stream with a more homogenous substrate.75  
 
The aggregate consequence of these physical and chemical changes usually is a stream with little 
resemblance to a stream in an undeveloped area.76 Native biodiversity decreases, with sensitive 
(and sometimes legally protected)77 species declining or disappearing.78 Streams can lose 
aesthetic appeal, with low, sluggish flows moving through wide, devegetated streambeds, except 
during occasional periods of high flow or flood.79 These changes are pervasive. Some survey 
studies conclude that water quality tends to decline when impervious surfaces cover more than 
10 percent of a watershed, and that small watersheds with more than 25 percent impervious 
cover almost always exhibit highly degraded water quality.80 Even sparse ex-urban development, 
if spread across a watershed, will exceed the former threshold, and stream degradation therefore 
is a standard feature of the landscapes in which most Americans live, work, and shop.81 Other 
recent research suggests that impacts begin at even lower development levels; several studies 
have found a consistent onset of degradation at impervious cover levels below 5 percent.82 The 
correlation between impervious cover and degradation in larger watersheds is less clear;83 while 
larger watersheds are still impacted, studies have not yet tied degrees of degradation to specific 
levels of urbanization.84 But even with those remaining uncertainties, scientists know that 
thousands of urban streams, small rivers, and even larger watersheds are significantly degraded 
by stormwater pollution from roofs and pavement.85  
 
While urbanization almost invariably lowers water quality, a variety of mechanisms can mitigate 
the effects.86 Builders can reduce the footprints of buildings and the area of roads or can 
substitute pervious pavement and green roofs87 for traditional road surfaces and building 
designs.88 Impervious surfaces can drain into infiltration swales or rain gardens rather than into 
storm drainage systems.89 Prohibitions on toxic products,90 educational programs, and 
maintenance programs like street sweeping can reduce pollutant loading.91 Uncertainties about 
treatment remain; few watershed-scale studies document the effectiveness of mitigation 
programs, and most researchers expect that no amount of planning and engineering can turn an 
urbanized landscape into the hydrologic equivalent of a forest.92 These solutions also cost 
money—particularly when they require retrofitting already developed areas—and financial 
constraints therefore could prevent full mitigation even if it were theoretically possible. But such 
measures, if transformed into standard practice, could slow the degradation of water quality in 
developing areas and improve it where development already has taken place. 
 
B. Traditional Legal Responses 
 
If impaired urban water quality is a pervasive problem but remedial tools exist, a logical next 
question is what combination of mandates and incentives will best facilitate the use of those 
tools. That question is largely legal, and traditional environmental laws attempt to provide some 
answers. But those answers have not proven particularly effective. As this section explains, 
neither of the CWA’s two primary regulatory systems has provided anything approaching full 
protection against the adverse water quality effects of urbanization. Nor have other 
mechanisms—most notably, state regulatory systems and the federal ESA—filled the void. The 
picture is far from completely negative; each approach has led to some protection, and with each, 
the trend may be toward greater effectiveness. But still, much room for progress remains. 
 
1. The NPDES Program 
 
The CWA’s primary mechanism for controlling water pollution is the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).93 The system applies to “any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source,”94 and the Act defines “point source” to include most 
human-controlled systems for conveying pollutants directly or indirectly to surface waters—
including most urban stormwater discharge systems.95 No such discharge may occur without a 
permit,96 and the permits usually specify numeric limitations on pollutant concentrations.97 
Permittees must monitor their discharges,98 and violations expose the permittee to governmental 
enforcement or citizen suits.99 Although the system has received some criticism,100 many 
commentators praise it,101 and most commentators at least credit the NPDES program with 
achieving substantial pollution reductions.102 But while highly successful in many ways, the 
NPDES program is widely viewed as a poor system for controlling stormwater pollution.103  
 
One problem with the NPDES program is the difficulty of monitoring stormwater quality.104 The 
program works relatively well for sources like industrial outfalls or wastewater treatment plants, 
which involve controlled systems that produce continuous and relatively consistent effluent 
flows—or, if they produce spikes, do so at predictable times.105 Stormwater, by contrast, flows 
on nature’s unpredictable schedule, and pollutant concentrations tend to vary within and between 
storm events, complicating sampling efforts.106 The EPA’s regulations acknowledge these 
complications by imposing only limited sampling requirements, and many permits require little 
or no testing.107 Because of variations in stormwater quality, the few samples that are collected 
may not be representative.108  
 
Even if comprehensive, continuous testing of stormwater effluent were possible, that testing 
would likely fail to reveal important data. The rate of stormwater flow can matter just as much 
as, if not more than, stormwater’s chemical composition, for flow rates help determine stream 
channel morphology, temperature, erosion and associated sediment loading, and in stream flow 
levels.109 Effluent testing also may not reveal the ultimate sources of pollutants and thus may not 
provide permittees and regulators with sufficient information to institute effective source 
controls. Because dozens of properties and multiple roadways can contribute runoff to a single 
municipal outfall, testing revealing excessive pollutant concentrations will not indicate which 
properties or roads—let alone which areas within those properties or roads—are primarily to 
blame.  
 
Those data shortages have led the EPA to use a different type of standard than it uses for 
traditional industrial or wastewater treatment plant outfalls.110 For conventional point sources, 
the EPA sets numeric standards that limit the concentrations of pollutants in effluent.111 
Stormwater permits instead require implementation of “best management practices” (BMPs)—
engineering, housekeeping, and, sometimes, educational measures designed to reduce pollutant 
discharges.112 Some sources also must test discharges periodically, but only infrequently, and for 
many potential sources, BMP implementation is the only permit requirement.113 Consequently, 
even if BMPs are fully implemented and carefully maintained, little or no independent oversight 
affirms that they are actually working.114 And while implementation and maintenance of some 
BMPs are easy to monitor, assessing compliance with others can be difficult, which leaves 
regulators and non-profit groups with little ability to verify and, if necessary, compel 
compliance.115 Exacerbating this problem is the discretion industrial facilities enjoy in selecting 
BMPs, which means that facilities may focus on pollution that can be controlled cheaply rather 
than pollution that causes the greatest downstream impact.116 Finally, while BMPs are typically 
designed to keep chemical and biological pollutants out of stormwater, other sources of 
degradation, like temperature increases and altered flow levels, often escape control.117  
 Adding to all of these limitations is the circumscribed applicability of the NPDES stormwater 
program. If stormwater does not pass through a point source—that is, if it simply runs off a site 
without ever passing through a ditch, pipe, or other discrete conveyance—the runoff does not 
meet the CWA’s definition of “discharge,” and does not require a NPDES permit, even if it 
conveys pollutants into waterways.118 Nor are all point source stormwater discharges subject to 
regulation. In 1987, after the EPA had struggled for years to fit stormwater into its regulatory 
program (after previously attempting, unsuccessfully, to avoid doing so),119 Congress amended 
the NPDES program to include some stormwater sources but to leave others out.120 Industrial 
sources, including the entire manufacturing sector, large construction sites, and larger municipal 
storm sewers, were to be included by 1990,121 and the EPA later expanded the program to 
include smaller construction sites and smaller municipal systems.122 But private, non-industrial 
stormwater drainage systems—for example, drainage systems from shopping malls or office 
parks—and municipal discharges from areas that do not meet the statutory criteria, still fall 
outside the program unless the EPA or state regulatory authorities affirmatively act to include 
them.123 Until quite recently, neither the EPA nor any state authority had ever taken that step.124  
 
The NPDES stormwater program is by no means completely ineffective. Permittees do have 
obligations, and while compliance data are sparse, clearly some businesses and municipalities do 
make substantial efforts at stormwater control.125 If a state is highly motivated to address 
stormwater issues, it may use its NPDES permitting authority as leverage to compel local 
action.126 Recent permit proposals also suggest that the EPA can use the NPDES program as a 
platform for developing innovative and more stringent regulatory requirements for sources 
already subject to regulatory coverage,127 and studies of stormwater management have identified 
the existing program as a useful starting point.128 Key elements of the program are fairly new; 
smaller municipal systems, for example, have been permitted only since 2003, and the program 
may grow more effective as permittees become more accustomed to its requirements. 
Nevertheless, the widespread critiques of the program and the persistence of stormwater-driven 
water-quality problems suggest that ample room for improvement remains. 
 
2. TMDLs 
 
While centrally important, the NPDES program is not the CWA’s sole mechanism for addressing 
water pollution. The Act also requires states to prepare pollution budgets, or “total maximum 
daily load[s]” (“TMDLs”), for water bodies not likely to attain water quality standards through 
technology-based controls alone.129 TMDLs specify how much pollutant loading the waterway 
can accommodate while still attaining water quality standards. TMDLs are to be implemented 
through both permitting130 and planning.131 This system should function as a backup approach, 
assuring attainment of water quality goals where technology-based controls alone are not 
sufficient.132 In practice, however, the TMDL approach has produced limited results.  
 
Little has been accomplished partly because the EPA and the states took so long to begin 
implementing the TMDL program.133 Only in the 1990s—after two decades in which TMDL 
requirements were almost completely ignored—did a series of environmental lawsuits succeed in 
jump-starting the program.134 But because of the delay—and the complexity, once the process 
actually begins, of drafting and implementing TMDLs—TMDL implementation in thousands of 
watersheds remains in its early stages.135  
 
The terms of the CWA also limit the TMDL program’s effectiveness. Section 303(d) requires 
states to develop water quality standards, identify water bodies that are failing to meet those 
standards, and develop overall pollution budgets for those water bodies.136 The EPA’s 
regulations go a step further, requiring that the TMDL divide the total pollution budget between 
a “load allocation[]” for non-point sources, a “wasteload allocation[]” for point sources,137 and a 
“margin of safety.”138 The CWA also links TMDLs to individual NPDES permits, which, at least 
in theory,139 must contain source-specific effluent limits sufficiently stringent to meet water 
quality standards.140 Finally, the Act requires state planning processes141 and allows federal 
grants to support these planning efforts.142 The Act, in short, imposes many obligations and 
creates a few incentives. But, it does not require that TMDLs include enforceable controls on 
specific sources.143 And if states fail to generate plans, or if their plans propose insufficient 
controls, the federal government cannot step in and substitute its own plans.144 Also, state plans 
are not federally enforceable, and citizen suits compelling implementation are possible only if 
authorized by state law.145  
 
TMDLs are not completely inconsequential. They usually document causes of impairment, and 
that information can be useful to regulators or watershed groups interested in pursuing 
restoration projects. Similarly, if states are motivated to address water quality problems, the 
TMDL process can provide a method for doing so.146 But the historic lack of state interest and 
the inherent weaknesses in the TMDL program leave most TMDLs as documents of, at best, 
uncertain regulatory importance.  
 
These problems exist for all TMDLs, but the TMDL method is particularly problematic when 
applied to urban stormwater, where its informational demands are especially difficult to fulfill. 
Section 303 of the CWA requires states to determine the maximum allowable daily load of each 
pollutant contributing to water quality impairments.147 This requirement presumes that state 
regulators can determine what each contributing pollutant is and what amount of that particular 
pollutant (allowing for a margin of error) the water body can assimilate. Often, however, and 
particularly with urban streams, regulators lack this knowledge.148 Urban stream impairment 
typically arises from a confluence of causes, including loading of multiple pollutants, changes to 
flow regimes, and habitat loss.149 Though scientists are currently trying to isolate the roles of 
different stressors, their efforts are in the early stages, and separating the combined effects of 
those stressors and generating allowable loads for each individual pollutant is currently very 
difficult. A focus on individual pollutants also is likely to ignore key stressors. Flow alterations, 
though potentially qualifying as “pollution” under the CWA, do not meet the Act’s narrower 
definition of “pollutant,” and therefore would not be included in a traditional TMDL.150 That 
does not mean regulators are ignorant about the causes of impairment; they may understand the 
underlying problem, for most stressors are ultimately traceable to or correlated with the extent of 
connected impervious cover in the watershed.151 But the intermediate links in the causal chain 
are difficult to discern, and it is on those intermediate links that the traditional TMDL approach 
focuses.  
 
In practice, this currently makes traditional, pollutant-by-pollutant TMDLs for urban impaired 
streams hard to draft and difficult to use. State regulators consistently told me that they have 
struggled to generate traditional TMDLs for urban impaired streams.152 While they were 
confident that impairment ultimately derived from connected impervious cover, they could not 
isolate specific intermediate stressors, even after completing extensive stressor analyses.153 Nor 
did they think fulfilling the TMDL requirements was a necessary predicate for restoration efforts. 
As long as regulators had some rigorous documentation of the root causes of watershed 
impairment, fulfilling all of the specific TMDL requirements seemed like a waste of time.154 
Consequently, they found the combination of TMDL requirements and impaired urban streams 
to be, as one regulator put it, “a square peg and a round hole.”155 
 
3. Other Legal Regimes 
 
While the CWA is the nation’s primary water quality law, it is not the only law that might 
address urban stormwater problems. Two other candidates—state and local water quality laws 
and the federal ESA—also seem promising, the former because our federalist system deliberately 
allows state and local governments to supplement federal efforts, and the latter because 
impairment of urban streams is, in large part, a problem of lost biodiversity. And in fact, both 
state water quality laws and the ESA have sometimes contributed to legal responses to urban 
stream impairment and may do so to a greater extent in the future. But, as with the CWA, neither 
solution has been or promises to be anything approaching comprehensive. 
 
a. State and local laws 
 
The CWA clearly allows states to supplement federal requirements.156 Local governments also 
may establish their own water quality controls so long as those controls are not preempted by 
state law. They also can use their traditional land-use authority to encourage development 
patterns compatible with water quality protection. In theory, therefore, state and local authorities 
could compensate for any weakness in the federal system of stormwater regulation.  
 
Some state governments have taken up that invitation. Several states have developed fairly 
comprehensive design standards for new development projects.157 Some have adopted strong 
landuse controls designed to limit the geographic extent, and therefore water quality impacts, of 
new development.158 Others have developed more focused programs for particularly sensitive 
regions or for riparian zones.159 Even when states have not directly regulated development, they 
often provide encouragement and technical assistance to local governments considering 
regulatory programs.160 Many local governments have implemented their own programs, some of 
which are quite sophisticated.161 These state and local efforts demonstrate that the federal 
government is not the only potential source of effective regulation of urban stormwater. Indeed, 
an optimal regulatory approach probably would include the kinds of development controls 
instituted by many cities and some states and would allow for other types of state and local 
innovation.162 
 
Nevertheless, these effective state and local steps are not the norm. Most states have not 
established any requirements that exceed the federal baseline.163 A few states have completely 
left the field to the federal government, electing not to assume authority over the NPDES 
program.164 Others have taken over NPDES permitting authority but have left that authority 
largely unexercised.165 Many states have actually taken affirmative steps to foreclose the 
possibility of supplementing the federal regulatory regime. By enacting laws that preclude state 
administrative agencies from establishing any requirements more strict than those of federal law, 
those states have effectively made federal requirements the only game in town.166 At the local 
level, the examples of innovative stormwater regulation, while impressive, also remain 
exceptional; most local governments continue to look to the state or federal government for 
regulatory direction.  
 
The paucity of state and local initiatives should not be surprising. For years, most state and local 
governments have been reluctant participants in water quality protection.167 Where states have 
assumed primary implementation authority, progress has often lagged.168 Consequently, while 
some important state and local efforts will likely continue to occur, there is little reason to expect 
that these initiatives will fill the gaps in the system of federal law.  
 
 b. The ESA 
 
The ESA169 might also offer a remedy for water quality problems caused by urbanization. The 
ESA is the nation’s primary legal mechanism for protecting biodiversity, and urban water quality 
problems typically lead to biodiversity loss.170 But for several reasons, the ESA has not yet been 
a particularly important source of protection for urban streams.  
 
First, streams in urbanizing areas tend to lose sensitive species quickly, and therefore most urban 
watersheds do not contain threatened or endangered species.171 Second, many of the decisions 
that lead to urbanization do not involve the federal government.172 Consequently, section 7 of the 
ESA, which precludes federal agencies from taking actions likely to “jeopardize” listed species 
or adversely modify their critical habitat, often does not apply.173 Third, the complex causal links 
between urbanization and water quality impacts limit the ESA’s relevance. Where the decline of 
a species derives from the cumulative impact of many individual decisions or from uncertain 
causes, the FWS and NOAA Fisheries have often been reluctant to use section 7 aggressively, 
instead allowing projects to gradually pile on incremental harms.174 The complexities of 
causation create even greater limits for enforcement of section 9 of the ESA,175 which, according 
to the Supreme Court, prohibits actions only if they proximately cause harm to discrete, 
identifiable animals.176 Perhaps not surprisingly, the ESA has assumed little relevance to urban 
stream protection,177 and plaintiffs have fared poorly in the few cases that sought to force the 
issue.178  
 
Despite these limitations, the ESA has occasionally spurred efforts to protect streams from 
urbanization and it may do so to a greater extent in the future. Several examples illustrate the 
ESA’s potential effects. In Georgia’s Etowah watershed, ESA-based restrictions have spurred the 
ongoing development of a conservation plan likely to involve the regulation of impervious cover 
runoff.179 Developers have faced similar limitations in parts of the Pacific Northwest, where 
protected salmon inhabit watersheds impacted by suburban expansion.180 In Texas, the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority is considering impervious cover limits as part of its efforts to protect the 
Edwards Aquifer and the springs and streams it feeds;181 those efforts began largely in response 
to the requirements of the ESA.182 While state NPDES program implementation decisions are not 
subject to ESA section 7, there are some states in which the EPA retains permitting authority, 
and in those states the EPA may require dischargers seeking stormwater permit coverage to 
either certify that their projects will not impact listed species or apply for special permits.183 If 
ESA section 7’s prohibition on adverse modification of critical habitat continues to emerge from 
the shadows,184 it could lead to significant new permitting requirements, as the relationship 
between impervious cover and aquatic habitat modification is well-documented.185 In short, the 
ESA, despite some limitations, can be a factor. But it has rarely been centrally important and is 
never likely to be the primary source of protection. 
 
4. Underlying Challenges 
 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, many of the failings of traditional stormwater regulation 
can be traced to specific provisions of individual laws. But the problems run deeper; for in 
several ways, urban stormwater presents exactly the kind of environmental challenge our legal 
system has traditionally struggled to solve. Scholars often argue that environmental laws do at 
least moderately well at addressing highly visible, readily understandable problems with discrete, 
identifiable sources.186 Untreated toxic effluent from a factory presents a classic example; the 
harm seems palpable and the perpetrator is easy to identify, and for the most part, our legal 
responses have been effective. But when harms are less visible and mechanisms of degradation 
are harder to understand, fashioning effective legal remedies has proven quite challenging. The 
challenges can grow even greater when the environmental problem derives from the cumulative 
effect of many small decisions rather than from a few discrete actions.187  
 
Urban stormwater presents a classic example of those difficulties. The sources of harm, while not 
impossible to see, are not nearly as apparent as pipes discharging raw effluent or clouds of air 
pollution. The causal mechanisms are sufficiently hidden and complicated that few people give 
them much thought (often one of the first tasks confronted by stormwater managers is 
conducting some very basic public education).188 And the underlying cause of harm is the 
cumulative effect of hundreds of development decisions; ultimately, it is a land use pattern our 
society has embraced.  
 
Those characteristics suggest that under any legal regime, urban watershed protection would 
present a substantial challenge. But they also suggest that urban watershed protection could 
provide valuable lessons. From air quality management to climate change mitigation to habitat 
protection, environmental managers face similar challenges, particularly as relationships between 
common development patterns and environmental degradation become increasingly clear.189 If 
regulators and watershed managers can develop more effective approaches to water quality 
protection, those approaches could inform, and perhaps create synergy with, efforts to address a 
variety of environmental problems. 
 II. EMERGING APPROACHES 
 
While traditional legal approaches to urban watershed protection have produced mixed results, 
this traditional regime is improving. Several of the recent innovations could dramatically change 
the scope of the NPDES program, the way TMDLs are written, and the form of permitting 
requirements. In combination, these changes suggest a fundamentally different approach that 
relies on information technology, collective permitting schemes, and adaptive management to 
better address the interactions between landscape attributes and watershed ecology. These 
emerging approaches also are backed by some of the most powerful engines of environmental 
law implementation: federal enforcement authority and citizen suits.190 The emerging approaches 
will not resolve all of the limitations inherent in older regulatory systems, and they create some 
new challenges. But even as partial, incremental reforms, they offer intriguing paths toward 
better water quality. 
 
A. Impervious Cover TMDLs 
 
One of the main challenges created by the traditional regulatory system is the poor fit between 
the CWA’s TMDL requirements and the problems facing urban streams. Where multiple sources 
generate multiple pollution problems, all of which synergistically interact to degrade water 
quality, applying a traditional TMDL-based approach means trying to untangle a Gordian Knot 
of causes and effects.191 These challenges are ironic, for the underlying problem—connected 
impervious cover—is often fairly clear.  
 
To circumvent that problem, regulators in several northeastern states have begun experimenting 
with proxy approaches, the most prevalent of which is the “impervious cover TMDL.”192 These 
TMDLs use the desired percentage of connected impervious cover in a watershed (minus a 
margin of error) as a surrogate for determining maximum allowable pollutant loadings.193 In 
other words, they treat connected impervious cover as a measure of pollutant loading, and they 
set a targeted cap on connected impervious cover rather than a targeted limit on pollutant 
loading. Thus, if an impaired stream drains a watershed with 15 percent impervious cover, but 
research suggests that streams in that state need closer to 11 percent connected impervious cover 
in order to meet relevant water quality standards, the TMDL might identify a connected 
impervious cover target somewhere below 9 percent (with the difference between 11 and 9 
percent creating the margin of error).194 Implementing the TMDL then would involve retrofitting 
existing development and regulating new construction with the goal of disconnecting or 
otherwise treating much of the existing impervious cover and any new impervious areas.195 The 
end result, ideally, would be a watershed that functions as though it had only 9 percent 
impervious cover and a stream that meets water quality standards.  
 
This approach presents several advantages. First, it simplifies the process of TMDL 
development. Regulators do not need to go through the extremely time-consuming process of 
developing defensible pollutant load limits for each individual pollutant.196 Instead, they may 
rely on land-cover data—which satellite photos and GIS technology make increasingly 
available—to assess the overall extent of impervious cover “loading.”197 Second, this approach 
should be more responsive to the stressors affecting urban watersheds. A pollutant-by-pollutant 
TMDL would ignore stressors—for example, excessive or insufficient flows or the loss of 
riparian habitat—that clearly are important to watershed health, but do not fit within the CWA’s 
definition of “pollutant.”198 An impervious cover TMDL addresses a key underlying source of 
those stressors and of traditional pollutants and therefore can more comprehensively diagnose a 
watershed’s problems.199 Third, this approach can produce better guidance for land use 
planners.200 A conventional TMDL establishes daily mass limits for each relevant pollutant, but 
planners are generally trained to think about using space, not managing pollutant loads. A limit 
expressed as a cap on connected impervious cover will be more readily understandable; local 
planners can intuitively grasp the extent of roof and pavement in their jurisdictions and the 
influence of local zoning and building requirements on the amount of impervious cover.201 An 
impervious cover TMDL therefore frames the problem so that local governments can start 
thinking about solutions.  
 
The approach also involves several potential disadvantages. Perhaps most importantly, the 
legality of impervious cover TMDLs is debatable. The appeal of an impervious cover TMDL is 
that it avoids the inefficiency and futility of pollutant-by-pollutant daily mass limits. But such 
limits are exactly what the plain language of the CWA, which demands “total maximum daily 
loads” for “pollutants,” presently202 seems to require.203 And while no court has evaluated 
impervious cover TMDLs, decisions addressing other parts of section 303 of the CWA suggest 
that the judiciary might enforce a literal reading, even where the challenged approach arguably 
serves the Act’s underlying goals.204 However, that result is by no means certain or clearly 
justified. For good reasons, judges often defer to agencies that compensate for environmental 
uncertainties by regulating proxy measures of environmental quality.205 And connected 
impervious cover is a sensible proxy measure; loads of many of the pollutants that stress urban 
streams do correlate with connected impervious area.206 Additionally, as scientific research on 
urban streams develops, regulators also may be able to refine their understanding of the relevant 
proxy relationships and might therefore offer stronger legal support for this approach. But for 
now, the question seems close enough to place impervious cover TMDLs in a legal gray area.  
 
The second potential problem is more practical: there is significant uncertainty about whether 
achieving the targeted “load” will actually translate into meeting water quality standards.207 
While using connected impervious cover percentage as a measure of watershed stress has a 
reasonable scientific basis, at least for small watersheds, data on the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures still are generally inconclusive.208 Regulators therefore may be confident that stream 
impairment is related to the amount of connected impervious cover in a watershed, but they 
cannot be sure that the targeted level of retrofits will fix that impairment. Simply setting a 
connected impervious cover target also is quite different from setting forth a blueprint for a 
comprehensive, implementable, and enforceable restoration program. Just as traditional TMDLs 
usually establish overall load and wasteload allocations without allocating cleanup responsibility 
to each specific source, impervious cover TMDLs generally do not specify who exactly will go 
about retrofitting their properties, to what standards, and with what methods.209  
 
Consequently, impervious cover TMDLs provide much better diagnoses than prescriptions. But 
an improved diagnosis is still useful, and, for streams impaired by urban stormwater, even a 
diagnosis is more than traditional TMDLs tend to provide. Besides, as subsequent sections 
discuss, prescriptions can come from other legal sources.  
 
B. Residual Designation Authority 
 
Another key challenge in protecting urban watersheds is the under-inclusive nature of the 
NPDES stormwater program. While that program applies to industrial facilities and to most 
municipal stormwater systems, it traditionally has ignored municipal systems that serve areas 
that do not meet the default criteria for inclusion in the permitting program. It also has not 
included private, non-industrial stormwater systems.210 Consequently, stormwater discharges 
from many office parks and big box developments, among other exempted sources, are 
essentially unregulated. Even for permitted facilities, most traditional permits lack effective 
mechanisms for addressing the impacts of impervious cover.211  
 
The CWA and the EPA’s implementing regulations, however, contain a potential—and, 
considering its historic obscurity, surprisingly powerful—fix for some of these problems. Section 
402(p), which defines the stormwater sources subject to and exempt from NPDES regulation, 
includes a catch-all provision requiring permits for “[a] discharge” that the EPA or a state with 
delegated NPDES permitting authority “determines . . . contributes to a violation of a water 
quality standard or is a significant contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States.”212 
The EPA’s implementing regulations echo that mandate and also allow “any person” to petition 
the EPA or an NPDES-implementing state to exercise this “residual designation authority.”213 
Once filed, a petition forces the EPA or the state to make a determination,214 and if the EPA or 
the state determines that the stormwater discharge contributes to water quality violations, 
permitting is mandatory.215 In other words, the Act and its regulations require permitting for any 
point source that contributes to water quality impairment, whether or not the source is a 
traditionally-regulated industrial facility, construction site, or municipal stormwater system, and 
they empower anyone to demand enforcement of that requirement.  
 
Although few people have paid attention to this provision,216 its implications are dramatic. 
Many—perhaps most— urban watersheds violate water quality standards, and ample research 
demonstrates that the violations derive largely from stormwater discharges, many of them 
currently unregulated.217 Indeed, the few watersheds where the EPA or states have exercised this 
“residual designation authority”—the upper Charles River in Massachusetts,218 Long Creek in 
Maine, and the area surrounding Burlington, Vermont219—hardly contain unique landscapes. The 
upper Charles flows through generic, rapidly growing fringe suburbs; Burlington contains a 
fairly typical transition from urban to rural landscapes; and Long Creek’s pattern of offices, 
malls, and roadways recurs across the nation.220 If residual designation authority applies there, it 
could apply throughout urban, suburban, and exurban America.221 Consequently, while the EPA 
and the states have rarely exercised residual designation authority, the rarity of designations 
derives from administrative reluctance and the absence— perhaps now ending222—of citizen 
suits, not from any limiting provision in the law itself.223  
 
Within those watersheds, residual designation authority could dramatically expand the number of 
permittees. Most owners of developed land in an impaired watershed will own something—a 
storm sewer system, a drainage ditch, or even a roof drain—that could be characterized as a point 
source and that contributes to the waterway’s impairment.224 In other words, most landowners in 
impaired watersheds meet the criteria for NPDES coverage. Some (though not all)225 of those 
landowners already are subject to regulation, at least indirectly—their properties may discharge 
into stormwater systems run by local governments, which in turn are subject to permitting 
requirements—but residual designation authority raises the possibility that each discharger will 
be directly and differently regulated.226 Under the letter of the law, most urban landowners are 
now potentially covered, and permitting is only an agency decision—or a petition and, perhaps, a 
lawsuit— away.227 
 
C. Collective Permitting 
 
A third set of critiques of existing regulatory approaches argues that even for covered facilities, 
the permitting requirements are flawed.228 The prospect of a massive expansion in the NPDES 
permitting program heightens the importance of these critiques, for residual designation authority 
might only direct more effort toward a failing approach implemented by politically constrained 
and severely underfunded state agencies.229 But, after years of advocacy from the EPA and 
others, a different permitting system is beginning to emerge, one that could mitigate some of the 
flaws in traditional permitting approaches.230 Despite its own complications and limitations, this 
collective permitting approach offers the prospect of improved regulation.  
 Recent developments in the Long Creek watershed, where regulators and permittees are 
experimenting with a single collective watershed permit, illustrate some of that potential.231 Each 
regulated landowner232 in the watershed will choose between buying into a collective permit or 
seeking individual permit coverage.233 Joining the collective permit will mean signing a contract 
obligating that landowner to pay an annual fee for each acre of impervious cover;234 allowing the 
newly created “Long Creek Watershed Management District”235 access to the landowner’s 
property; and committing the landowner to participation in some collective housekeeping 
programs.236 The funding will allow the management district to design and implement a series of 
restoration projects, which will range from restoration of riparian habitat to installation of 
stormwater treatment systems.237 Rather than treating each individual parcel as a separate project 
with a separate budget, managers will implement projects that offer the greatest environmental 
return for the lowest financial cost, regardless of where those projects are located.238 
Simultaneously, local land use regulators will heighten controls on new development while 
relaxing some of the existing controls—minimum parking space requirements, for example—
that previously encouraged development of impervious area.239  
 
This approach involves some challenges. The transaction costs are large; regulators and the 
potential permittees have already spent hundreds of hours developing this conceptual approach 
and then turning it into a permit and a proposed contract.240 Fairness concerns are likely. 
Regulated landowners question the exclusion of smaller landowners and wonder why local 
residents, who rely on commercial property values to limit their own tax payments, should not 
pay.241 If the management district works primarily on a few properties, other owners may wonder 
if they were relatively small contributors to the watershed’s problems and therefore should have 
paid less.242 And governance will sometimes be difficult. Even a small watershed like Long 
Creek contains many landowners, and coordinating decisions will be an ongoing challenge. In a 
watershed with more and smaller landowners,243 the transaction costs and potential for conflicts 
could be significantly higher.  
 
On the other hand, the potential payoff is huge. By allowing watershed managers to focus on the 
highest-return projects, a collective approach should save permittees a lot of money.244 The 
approach also allows some economies of scale in maintenance projects; a coordinated multi-
landowner street sweeping program, for example, should cost much less than the aggregate cost 
of property-by-property individual efforts.245 Watershed managers may be able to implement 
fixes, like riparian habitat restoration or changes to local planning and building codes, that could 
not occur under a traditional permitting approach.246 The collective approach can facilitate 
coordination not just across property but also jurisdictional boundaries; the permit area will 
cover multiple towns, thus partially avoiding the common problems created by mismatches 
between watershed and political boundaries.247 The project will not be cheap, but over the life of 
the restoration project these advantages should produce significant cost savings.248 Preliminary 
estimates suggest a 60 percent or greater reduction in costs.249  
 
The collective permitting approach also creates a different dynamic among landowners. Instead 
of placing each permittee in a separate relationship with regulatory authority, the collective 
permit can create a sense of collective responsibility among permittees.250 If several landowners 
neglect to pay into the fund or to allow access to their land, other landowners will need to pay 
more, and therefore they have a collective incentive to police their fellow permittees.251 That 
dynamic already seems to have had salutary effects in the Long Creek Watershed area. First, the 
prospect of implementing an approach that could save money inspired members of the business 
community to work hard to promote the process.252 Second, business community members 
already have engaged and continue to engage in serious conversations about ways to police 
compliance and to cooperate on restoration.253  
 
Finally, while the initial transaction costs may be quite high, the Long Creek process provides an 
important learning opportunity.254 The creation of multiple committees and subcommittees has 
created forums for dialogue among permittees, and between permittees, towns, and regulators, 
providing important opportunities for exchanging information. The centralized administrative 
structure also allows a coordinated monitoring strategy, which should better allow for adaptation 
as the project proceeds.255 Through that monitoring and documentation of procedures and results, 
the Long Creek effort also could provide a useful example for other watersheds; indeed, multiple 
participants expressed the hope that the process would create, as one put it, a “replicable model 
for how to restore an impaired urban watershed.”256 While in some ways unique, the Long Creek 
process is in other ways representative of a broader trend.257 The EPA, National Research 
Council panels, and other groups have been advocating “watershed-based permitting” for years, 
and that advocacy has slowly but increasingly begun to result in real world experiments.258 In 
Georgia’s Etowah Watershed, for example, local governments are complying with the ESA by 
developing a habitat conservation plan in some ways similar to the Long Creek permit.259 Other 
areas have experimented with stormwater utilities, which impose service charges on all entities 
served by a water or wastewater utility and use the revenues to fund stormwater management 
activities.260 The Long Creek process involves more intensive and expensive effort than many of 
these other projects,261 but it still reflects a broader shift toward using innovative permitting 
approaches to allow watershed-scale remediation.  
 
The benefits of these alternative approaches should not be overstated. Permit compliance still 
will cost money, and trans action costs may sometimes make these alternative approaches 
completely untenable. Indeed, there are probably reasons beyond mere inertia why so few 
watershed permitting processes have developed despite the EPA’s sustained promotion of the 
idea.262 But the gradual emergence of these approaches does at least suggest the prospect of a 
feasible, if not easy, way to cost-effectively integrate more landowners into regulatory processes 
and thus to begin addressing the impacts of development patterns on water quality. 
 
D. The Combination 
 
In isolation, each of these changes might be ineffectual or even problematic. Impervious cover 
TMDLs could just identify problems while prescribing only unworkable or overly general 
cures.263 Residual designation authority, while powerful, cannot be invoked without a watershed-
specific evidentiary basis.264 If widely invoked, it also could overwhelm the NPDES program 
with a flood of new permittees. Collective watershed-based permitting, standing alone, is an 
aspiration without a supporting mandate. The whole point of watershed-based permitting is to 
address the full range of stressors affecting a watershed,265 but sources without permitting 
obligations have no incentive to participate. 
 
 In combination, however, these approaches move toward an improved regulatory system. The 
combination is not perfect—in some ways, it leaves excessive discretion, and in others it may be 
too onerous266—and many other possible measures exist.267 But this particular combination is a 
useful starting point for contemplating more comprehensive reform.  
 
To understand the significance of the shift, one must first reconsider the two traditional 
regulatory approaches to water pollution control. The NPDES approach treats most permitted 
facilities like pipes abstracted from environmental context,268 with little attention paid to the 
development patterns on the permittee’s property or on adjacent land. While that approach has 
worked well for discrete pollutant sources amenable to end-of-the-pipe technological controls—
in practice, industrial and municipal wastewater discharges—it has accomplished little when 
landscape patterns are central to pollution problems.269 The traditional TMDL/planning approach 
does consider landscape patterns and environmental context, but its informational demands are 
very difficult to fulfill, and it is nearly toothless.270 Consequently, there is no straightforward 
way, if regulators use traditional approaches, to address landscape-derived pollution through a 
manageable and mandatory set of controls. Nor have environmental groups found a way to use 
citizen suits to force regulators to that endpoint.  
 
An effective system of controls on landscape-based pollution would be quite differently 
constructed. It would require regulators to diagnose situations where land use patterns are 
causing pollution problems;271 it would contain a method for linking those diagnoses to permits 
on specific sources; and it would include some way of writing effective controls into those 
permits.272 The system as a whole would be at least moderately efficient and fair, lest recalcitrant 
permittees and reluctant regulators stymie implementation.273 Its evidentiary demands would not 
outstrip the capacity of watershed scientists to supply information.274 The system would provide 
opportunities for motivated and innovative people to creatively craft their own solutions.275 
Because of the substantial uncertainty inherent in water quality planning, it also would create 
mechanisms for adaptive learning and adjustment.276 And the system probably would empower 
outside parties to compel regulation when regulators are underfunded, politically constrained, or 
otherwise reluctant to act.277 Absent any of those elements, the system would likely prove 
unworkable.  
 
The new approaches discussed above better conform to that more effective model. Although a 
TMDL is neither the only nor, perhaps, the best method of arriving at a diagnosis, theTMDL 
process does at least compel states to figure out why waterways are impaired.278 And while 
fulfilling that obligation normally is difficult when urban stormwater is the key stressor, 
impervious cover TMDLs create a feasible and relatively efficient method for reaching those 
diagnoses. TMDLs normally create little compulsion for treatment, but the possibility of residual 
designation authority significantly changes the equation. If a TMDL identifies aggregate 
impervious cover levels as underlying causes of water quality impairment, then every landowner 
with point-source discharges from impervious cover is responsible for contributing to those 
water quality violations, and the evidentiary basis exists for exercising residual designation 
authority.279 The default next step—individualized permitting of every owner of impervious 
cover in the watershed—would likely be unworkable; but collective permitting offers the 
prospect of a more collaborative, adaptive, cost-effective, and administratively streamlined 
approach. In short, impervious cover TMDLs and permitting provisions can provide mandatory 
steps from diagnosis to enforceable permit, and watershed-based permitting provides a way of 
making the permitting actually work.  
 
This particular combined system is by no means a perfectly constructed model. By avoiding 
monitoring, states may avoid even identifying impaired urban streams.280 States have no legal 
obligation—and even have significant legal impediments in the current language of the CWA—
to prepare impervious cover TMDLs.281 The requirements of NPDES permits for residual 
designation authority sources are not clearly specified by the statute,282 and while the EPA and 
the states could write permits with genuine constraints, they also might imitate the general, 
hortatory, and largely unenforceable permits widely used for many traditionally-regulated 
stormwater sources.283 Finally, there is an element of a bluff in any state or federal threat to 
exercise residual designation authority across the landscape. Absent the use of watershed 
permitting, stormwater utilities, or some other system that creates administrative efficiency and 
economies of scale, few states or EPA offices could oversee a comprehensive permitting 
program—particularly for residential watersheds, where regulators might face the distasteful 
prospect of requiring NPDES permits from individual households.284 For all these reasons, the 
combination of approaches represents a set of steps toward a better regulatory system, not a 
finished product. 
 III. FEDERALIZING THE LANDSCAPE? 
 
The combination of mechanisms described above may represent a promising shift, but the core 
insight upon which that shift rests—that protecting water quality often means regulating 
landscape and development patterns—creates potential conflict with a commonly expressed 
vision of environmental federalism, in which land use controls should be imposed only at the 
local or state level.285 That conflict could doom the new regulatory model, no matter how 
sensible it might be, for the traditional view has become powerful and deeply entrenched. This 
section therefore explains why that common federalism approach, though appealing, could 
produce unfortunate outcomes in this context. 
 
A. Prevailing Fears 
 
For decades, Congress has signaled that land use planning is a state or local prerogative. In the 
1970s, proposed federal land use planning laws almost all failed to secure passage, and 
administrative efforts to control pollution through land use regulation met their demise amid 
vociferous political opposition.286 In the CWA, Congress made a show of bowing to those 
preferences; it asserted its intent “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of the States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”287 
While the Act’s substantive provisions have imposed limits upon that authority—wetlands 
protections, for example, clearly affect land development—the idealization of local land use 
planning has continued to dominate congressional rhetoric. For decades, the preferred battle cry 
against any expansion in the CWA’s scope has been to warn of plots “to give federal bureaucrats 
authority to make final decisions about local land use.”288 And, particularly in recent decades, the 
preferred defense has been to argue, not that federal law has some role to play in land use 
decisions, but instead that federal law remains safely on the environmental side of the land 
use/environmental law divide.289  
 
The Supreme Court has carried the same tune, sometimes with equal vigor. The Court has 
insisted that environmental regulation and land use law occupy distinct and separate realms.290 It 
also has suggested that this distinction holds constitutional significance, with federal regulation 
that strays too far into the realm of land use being potentially suspect.291 Meanwhile, judicial 
defenders of federal water quality protection, much like the congressional advocates of water 
quality legislation, sometimes appear to concede the inappropriateness of having federal 
regulation affect land uses. They seem to prefer to assert that the CWA appropriately sticks to 
environmental protection.292 The Court has been far from consistent in asserting this distinction, 
and justices have sometimes suggested that Congress may trump local land use authority 
wherever the Commerce Clause permits.293 These federalist intuitions also have yet to coalesce 
into any sort of discrete legal standard and may never do so.294 But the overall message—albeit a 
mixed one—is that courts may question any regulatory initiative that extends federal law any 
further into the realm of land use planning.  
 
Some of this legislative and judicial skepticism clearly derives from an anti-regulatory agenda, 
and many statements suggest at least as much frustration with the substance of regulatory 
programs as with their source.295 But the rhetoric also foreshadows a genuine clash between the 
emerging controls on landscape-derived water pollution and a prominent vision of federalism, in 
which liberty, responsive government, civic engagement, and experimentation all are promoted 
by cabining federal authority in limited and discrete spheres296—land use regulation not among 
them. It also tracks broader themes voiced in academic literature, which often portray federal 
environmental regulation as blunt, inefficient, rigid, and litigious,297 and identifies local 
governance as the desirable ideal.298 Most academic critiques are more nuanced than the political 
broadsides and often support different fixes; many of the most prominent academic critics of 
traditional federal environmental regulation prefer a shift toward incentive-based regulation 
rather than systematic devolution to state or local control.299 But the aggregate impression one 
could easily take from these political, judicial, and academic dialogues is that any extension of 
the CWA’s reach, or the reach of any other federal environmental statute, into land use planning 
will be the antithesis of good-government reform. An extension spurred by litigation would be 
even worse.300  
 
All of this may sound compelling in theory. But actual practice provides an important test. And 
while one case study obviously cannot prove a general point, a return to Long Creek, where 
residual designation authority already has dramatically extended the CWA’s reach, can shed 
some light on the theoretical case against federal expansion. To date, what has actually happened 
is quite different from what prevailing federalist theory would predict. Instead of producing a 
disaster, the intervention of federal law has actually served as a spur to innovative governance. 
 B. Practical Realities 
 
Until the latter part of the last decade, federal environmental law played little role in the 
development of the Long Creek watershed. Land use development occurred primarily at the local 
level.301 Nor was there much public involvement in those planning decisions. South Portland in 
particular302 was a developer’s town, a place where local government courted businesses and 
citizen involvement in planning decisions was minimal.303 What emerged in the Long Creek 
watershed was neither a distinctive land use pattern nor a particularly hospitable one. A visitor 
dropped down amid the watershed’s malls and offices would have no clue where in America he 
was—an ironic result in a state that takes pride in achieving a distinctive quality of place.304  
 
State and local governments did at times express concerns about stormwater runoff and water 
quality, but their concerns produced few results. In the 1970s and 1980s, as development was 
booming, regulators imposed some controls designed to limit flooding.305 Later, the Maine 
Department of Environmental Protection (the “Maine DEP”) used federal funding to conduct a 
comparative study assessing differences between Long Creek and a neighboring, mostly 
undeveloped watershed. The study demonstrated that Long Creek had markedly reduced 
biodiversity and increased pollutant levels.306 But, at least initially, regulatory controls did not 
follow.307 Local government representatives were also concerned about the watershed’s land use 
pattern, but had not figured out how to induce change.308  
 
A few years after the studies, however, circumstances shifted dramatically. In 2007, the City of 
South Portland, with the support of other towns and the Maine DEP, initiated a collaborative 
planning process to address water quality problems in Long Creek.309 Using federal grant money, 
the participants hired a professional facilitator who drew in additional participants, and they 
secured sustained involvement from the local chamber of commerce and from many of the 
watershed’s largest public and private landowners.310 Over several years, and through many 
meetings, they developed the collective permitting approach described above. As this article goes 
to press, 93 percent of the eligible landowners have elected to participate in the collective permit, 
and the management district is beginning to implement restoration projects.311  
 
Participants consistently describe the process as something special, a demonstration of the 
positive potential of local collaboration. The mutual respect among the participants is striking. In 
interviews, they consistently praised fellow participants, including people who might normally 
have been their adversaries.312 While collaborative environmental management may sometimes 
produce warm feelings but few results, here the participants’ enthusiasm seems justified. The 
participants’ watershed-based permitting approach is genuinely innovative, could produce real 
environmental benefits at significant cost savings, and could provide a template for restoration 
efforts elsewhere in the state or nation. And even if the effort does not succeed in cost-effectively 
meeting restoration targets, the process at the very least will provide important information for a 
belatedly growing public debate on how to address pervasive gaps between legal water quality 
standards and actual environmental conditions.  
 
All those positive outcomes did not occur, however, because of cabined federal authority or 
because of the absence of traditional legal levers. The EPA was minimally involved in the 
discussions, other than to provide the grant funding that made them possible.313 But the 
participants generally concurred—some grudgingly, others emphatically—that few positive 
outcomes would have occurred had the Conservation Law Foundation (“CLF”), a regional 
environmental group, not threatened to invoke federal law by filing a residual designation 
authority petition.314 Similarly, most participants agreed that the CLF’s decision to actually file 
the petition helped focus the collaborators’ efforts.315 That decision ruffled some feathers, but it 
strengthened regulators’ hands and created a sense of urgency for the potential permittees, 
providing an incentive for everyone to stay at the table.316 One anecdote summarizes the 
importance of that federal lever: a city councilmember told me that at a watershed tour early in 
the process, he had encouraged a CLF attorney to file suit, on the theory that it would take a legal 
obligation to motivate local action.317  
 
The Long Creek process does support some aspects of the traditional federalist vision described 
above. It shows that real environmental management expertise and creative potential exist at 
local levels;318 that some private companies can and will constructively embrace environmental 
restoration efforts;319 and that collaboration can produce not just a satisfying process but also 
substantive results.320 The Long Creek story also provides reminders that even if legal threats 
may sometimes be necessary prerequisites for successful collaboration, they are rarely sufficient; 
by all accounts, the expertise, patience, and diplomacy of many participants, including the same 
attorneys who were creating the legal threat, were essential to the group’s success.321  
 
Obviously, this story does not, by itself, prove a general point. Long Creek is just one watershed, 
and in some ways a distinctive one.322 But what happened in Long Creek is consistent with a 
broader trend identified throughout much of the literature on watershed protection and 
environmental governance. Federal law, sometimes invoked by environmental groups 
threatening or actually filing lawsuits, has often triggered, not squelched, local creativity. 
Innovative restoration processes on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers.323 the Columbia 
River,324 the Platte,325 the Everglades,326 and the Kennebec River,327 to provide just a few 
examples, all started under the pressure of federal law and often at least partially in response to 
actual or threatened litigation. State and local governments do not always need a federal push to 
act, of course; sometimes they pursue innovative approaches despite federal inactivity or even 
opposition.328 But the stories are legion, particularly in the field of water law, of federal law’s 
absence (or non-enforcement) producing not innovation but nearly homogenous inaction.329  
 
That trend suggests that the standard federalism rhetoric is missing something important. A core 
premise of that rhetoric is that federal disengagement correlates with local involvement and 
innovation.330 No doubt that is sometimes true. But sometimes federal disengagement provides 
space for different national-scale actors—in Long Creek, for example, the national chains that 
occupy much of the watershed—to impose standardized development patterns, or for local 
businesses, city governments, and highway agencies to copy cookie-cutter approaches developed 
elsewhere, notwithstanding the preferences of the local electorate. Federal law, in other words, is 
not the only potential source of uniformity, and the absence of federal law does not necessarily 
mean robust local engagement. And if federal law applies, as it often does, while creating 
opportunities for local involvement,331 it may inspire and empower local individuals or groups to 
create diversity and innovation, which are exactly the things a federalist system is supposed to 
promote.332  
 
The Long Creek experience thus demonstrates, at the very least, that the standard federalist 
rhetoric is not always right. And it provides a strong data point in support of alternative views 
emerging in recent academic work. Whether termed “adaptive federalism,” “modular 
regulation,” or something else, these alternative conceptual approaches emphasize overlapping 
authority as a precondition for intergovernmental dialogue and innovation.333 These authors 
suggest that creativity and engagement thrive when we empower different levels of government 
to work together and to work with environmental groups and private sector businesses, subject to 
some background constraints supplied by federal law.334 Their theories also acknowledge the 
reality that environmental governance and environmental politics are inherently multi-
jurisdictional.335 Many environmental problems correspond poorly to more localized political 
boundaries,336 and, contrary to conventional federalist rhetoric suggesting all problems should be 
resolved as locally as possible, the American public widely supports environmental initiatives 
from multiple layers of governance.337 These alternative conceptions of federalism thus provide 
theoretical counterpoints to the prevalent view that federalism functions best as a system of 
separating boundaries. They argue instead that a system of integrated responsibilities and 
interpenetrated levers for action is both pragmatically and democratically preferable. The Long 
Creek process provides empirical evidence of the merit of those alternative conceptions of 
federalism. 
 
IV. TRIAGING WATERSHEDS 
 
While the Long Creek process was unfolding, another Maine city was beginning its own urban 
stream restoration project. Birch Stream, which flows through Bangor, Maine, is not a prominent 
community resource. An airport and a mall cover much of the watershed, and Birch Stream 
emerges from culverts only half a mile from its confluence with a larger stream.338 A few 
residences occupy the lower watershed, but no public walkways follow the stream’s banks.339 A 
longtime local water manager told me that he had never known the waterway was anything more 
than a drainage ditch.340 But in the eyes of the law, Birch Stream is just as important as a longer, 
more accessible urban stream, and its failure to attain water quality standards is legally 
problematic. The State of Maine has prepared a TMDL for the watershed,341 and the City of 
Bangor already has spent approximately five million dollars on restoration work, with more to 
come.342  
 
Birch Stream highlights different questions about urban watersheds—questions that assume 
greater urgency with the emergence of legal tools potentially capable of compelling restoration 
of nearly every urban, suburban, and exurban stream. Is rehabilitation of urban watersheds really 
worth the costs? Even if it is, at least in the aggregate, should some watersheds enjoy higher 
priority than others? And even if prioritization would be good policy, is it legal? If not, how can 
legal reforms allow triage without creating a slippery slope toward complete inaction? These are 
all thorny questions, and this section begins addressing the answers. 
 
A. The Case for Prioritization 
 
In recent years, a variety of commentators, including some who are strongly committed to water 
quality improvement, have argued against comprehensive and complete restoration of urban 
watersheds. For example, the Center for Watershed Protection has urged abandoning full 
restoration as a goal for urban watersheds, and the organization’s founder has argued that water 
quality expectations should be inversely proportional to the degree of watershed urbanization.343 
A recent National Research Council (“NRC”) study of urban stormwater management echoed 
that suggestion.344 Somewhat similarly, several previous reports by the NRC and others have 
argued that water quality restoration efforts should be combined with continuous reassessment of 
restoration goals,345 and the EPA has encouraged “use attainability analyses,” which assess the 
feasibility of actually attaining water quality standards.346 These recommendations all reflect a 
widely shared perception that current water quality goals are often unrealistic and 
counterproductive and therefore ought to be widely changed.347  
 
There are multiple justifications for this view. First, demanding standards, while symbolically 
appealing, may be excessively expensive.348 Complete restoration of every urbanized watershed 
is almost certainly impossible, for even with the best treatment systems, an urban landscape 
cannot function like an undeveloped forest.349 Even achieving more modest restoration goals is 
much more costly than preventing degradation in a relatively healthy watershed, for retrofitting 
development usually costs more than building in a particular way in the first instance.350 Many 
urban stream specialists therefore think that the best ratios of environmental gain to financial cost 
could be realized by focusing on watersheds at or beyond the suburban fringe.351 In highly 
urbanized areas, by contrast, the environmental benefits of restoration may fall short—far short, 
in the view of some observers—of justifying the multi-million dollar costs, and lower standards 
might be more consistent with societal goals.352  
 
Many commentators also worry that focusing on the most heavily urbanized watersheds could be 
environmentally counterproductive.353 Recognizing the links between impervious cover density 
and water quality, cities and states might preclude additional development within already-
urbanized watersheds and impose large lot size requirements or other density controls in less 
developed areas.354 Some localities already have tried the latter approach, sometimes voluntarily 
and, in the Pacific Northwest, sometimes under pressure from fisheries regulators.355 But if these 
restrictions just spread development, the aggregate effect will be more sprawl, leading to greater 
aggregate water quality impacts and also to increased habitat loss, road construction, vehicle 
miles traveled, and air pollution emissions, among other problems.356 Similarly, even if local 
governments impose no zoning constraints, the economic cost of urban stream restoration 
requirements might discourage infill development357 and create a sort of “brownsheds”358 
problem, with environmental liabilities limiting urban redevelopment and pushing construction 
to the undeveloped urban fringe. That outcome would be ironic, for local governments might 
attain larger environmental benefits by concentrating their planning and regulatory efforts upon 
such undeveloped areas. Indeed, many of the standard mechanisms for protecting less developed 
watersheds—limiting road length and size, preserving trees, and clustering development to 
protect open space, for example—could complement efforts to address other adverse 
consequences of urbanization.359  
 The third primary argument in favor of systemized prioritization is that, as a practical matter, 
some prioritization is inevitable. Even if laws ostensibly require restoration of every urban 
stream, local, state, and federal governments will be hard-pressed to find the time, money, and 
political capital to fulfill those mandates.360 Many watershed restoration efforts rely on federal 
grant funding, but there are not sufficient funds for every stream, and every grant for urban 
stream restoration is unavailable for other water quality initiatives.361 Permitting requirements 
theoretically could transfer much of the financial burden to regulated permittees. But private 
resources are not infinite, and with tight state and federal budgets, the additional resources and 
personnel necessary to even administer expanded permitting programs will not be readily 
forthcoming, even if the political will to regulate is. Consequently, state and local governments 
will pick their spots, no matter what the law ostensibly requires. Environmental groups 
theoretically could spur pervasive regulation through litigation, but that too is unlikely; such 
groups generally can afford to address only a subset of their priorities.362 Indeed, given their 
limited resources, both government agencies and environmental groups might well be inclined to 
focus on the most degraded watersheds.363 Despite all the advantages of preventive work, 
sometimes only a present crisis can motivate a response—or provide a sufficiently clear basis for 
a legal action.364 Consequently, if some prioritization inevitably will occur, perhaps it ought to 
occur systematically rather than through the uncoordinated, opportunistic, and largely reactive 
decisions of dozens of underfunded and overstretched entities, all struggling to implement a 
sometimes symbolic and occasionally overly stringent legal mandate.  
 
B. The Case Against Prioritization 
 While a triage approach may be practically unavoidable, it will create its own problems. The 
issues are partly legal; despite the arguments in its favor, triaging does not fit well with the 
existing regulatory scheme. That regulatory structure could change, but there are also powerful 
practical arguments against a more flexible approach. 
 
1. Legal Constraints 
 
Much of the literature on urban watersheds suggests that the EPA and the states could readily 
start downgrading water quality standards for urban streams.365 And the CWA does seem to 
provide several mechanisms. Setting water quality standards is a state responsibility, though the 
EPA holds approval authority, and states do establish more protective standards for some 
waterways than for others.366 States also must update their water quality standards every three 
years, and that process theoretically should allow for continuing adjustment.367 States may 
downgrade water quality standards if they can demonstrate, through use attainability analyses, 
that current standards cannot be fulfilled.368 Finally, even where standards themselves cannot be 
revised, states are obligated to create “priority ranking(s)” for impaired water bodies.369 In 
combination, these provisions suggest substantial flexibility.  
 
In practice, however, standards typically are ambitious and difficult to change. The CWA’s 
initial deadlines for setting standards were quite short,370 and the EPA pressed the states to adopt 
standards consistent with the Act’s “interim” goal of making waters fishable and swimmable 
unless the states could affirmatively demonstrate that those goals were unattainable.371 Many 
states, lacking time to perform comprehensive studies (or, perhaps, lacking willingness to admit 
to modest goals), elected to base all of their standards on those interim goals.372 Consequently, 
many states’ standards initially demanded fairly pristine water quality across the map, even in 
urban areas where people would readily accept substantial alteration of terrestrial ecosystems.373 
These ambitious goals were not happenstance; spurring major improvements in water quality, 
even at great cost, was the whole point of the CWA.374 And most states do have tiered 
expectations, not uniform, blanket standards.375 But, as years of subsequent research have 
revealed, even the lower-tier standards may be difficult to reconcile with the hydrologic realities 
of traditional urban development,376 and the challenges have only grown as urbanization has 
expanded across the American landscape.377  
 
While the tension between ambitious water quality standards and urbanization patterns has 
become increasingly clear, revising those standards to accommodate urban development is not 
easy. In accordance with federal anti-degradation requirements,378 states may lower water quality 
standards only if a use attainability analysis demonstrates that the water body cannot attain 
quality levels sufficient to support a water body’s designated “uses.”379 For several reasons, such 
demonstrations are difficult to make. First, the EPA does not allow states to abandon a 
designated use that is also an “existing use.”380 That might not seem constraining, for the core 
problem in many urban areas is that streams currently fail to support their designated uses, but 
the EPA defines an existing use as any use that existed at any time after November 28, 1975.381 
Consequently, for many areas that urbanized after 1975— which includes much of suburban 
America—a downgrade is not legally possible. Second, while the EPA’s regulations allow use 
attainability analyses to consider the social and economic costs of restoration, those costs cannot 
be the justification for a downgrade if technology-based controls on point sources, including 
sources designated under residual designation authority, could still lead to attainment.382 Third, 
the EPA generally adheres to a presumption of attainability, and the burden of proof thus lies 
with the party arguing that a use cannot be attained.383 Finally, despite the EPA’s recent 
promotion of use attainability analyses,384 guidelines for preparing those analyses are still 
sparse.385 Successful use attainability analyses therefore remain rare, particularly for streams in 
urbanizing areas.386  
 
States often still do try to adjust their goals for impaired water bodies. They have attempted to 
delay promulgation of standards until use attainability analyses could be completed,387 to 
“interpret” water quality standards in ways that effectively revise them,388 or to submit water 
quality standards that fall short of statutory requirements.389 Through sparse monitoring or 
creative definition of water quality standards, states also can avoid even identifying water quality 
problems.390 And, as Houck and others have thoroughly documented, states’ efforts to respond to 
the water quality violations they do detect have been uneven at best, particularly outside of the 
traditional NPDES permitting program.391 The EPA has sometimes intervened to address those 
practices,392 but not always, and often only when compelled by court order.393 In short, legal 
limits on flexibility do not mean the practical absence of flexibility, and even with the emergence 
of a powerful legal lever like residual designation authority, rigidly consistent adherence to strict 
water quality standards is unlikely.394 Nevertheless, with legal paths to downgrades difficult to 
follow, if not actually blocked, and illegal paths potentially precluded by EPA oversight or 
judicial enforcement, a major shift in water quality standards for urban streams seems possible 
only through widespread and uncorrected disregard for existing law.  
 
2. Information and Incentives 
 
While existing law may limit revisions to urban water quality standards, that alone is not 
sufficient reason to reject the possibility of such revisions. Laws can change. And in this context, 
where many of the key legal requirements come from administrative regulations and interpretive 
documents, legal change could occur more readily than if major statutory revisions were 
necessary.395 But there are reasons why the inflexibility of current law may be quite valuable.  
 
Understanding the potential value of inflexibility requires considering the perils a more flexible, 
triage-based approach would create. To work well, triage requires adequate information, a 
disinterested decision-maker, a process for making comparative decisions, and an accepted 
methodology for drawing distinctions. Absent information, triage can turn to guesswork. Without 
a comparative process and an accepted decision-making methodology, decisions can easily 
become haphazard and inconsistent. And without a disinterested decision-maker, a triaging 
process obviously will be tainted by bias. In short, in the absence of fairly ideal conditions, a 
prioritization system could turn incoherent or could easily degenerate into a process for 
developing watershed-by-watershed excuses for doing nothing. Even worse, with the threat of 
expensive watershed restoration requirements gone, state and local governments might lose their 
primary incentive to protect watersheds that are stillhealthy, or that are only moderately 
degraded.396 Unfortunately, in the context of urban watershed management, all of these 
necessary elements may often be absent.  
 
The first potential practical problem with a prioritization approach is the likely pervasiveness of 
information gaps. An informed decision about urban watershed restoration would likely require 
consideration of the ecosystem services provided by the stream and its surrounding habitat (both 
within and downstream of the watershed). Decision makers also ought to consider the values 
current and future people, both within and outside of the adjacent community, would place upon 
those ecosystem services, the recreational value of the stream, and the economic and political 
feasibility of protecting or restoring the watershed. Ideally, managers also would be able to 
assign some weight to the importance of an ethical commitment to environmental integrity, 
however such integrity might be defined for an urban setting.397 And they might also want to 
consider the economic incentives and political signals that watershed protection or restoration 
would create. Would a robust and ex pensive restoration mandate push development to other 
locales or, perhaps, induce other locales to better regulate development? Both reactions seem 
plausible—and there is some evidence that Long Creek already is spurring the latter 
reaction398—and the relative likelihood of the two reactions has major implications for policy 
choices.  
 
Unfortunately, much of this information is presently unavailable.399 Managers may have little 
idea what an urban watershed means to the surrounding community, and people in the 
community may not understand the recreational benefits or ecosystem services the watershed 
provides—or could provide if somehow restored.400 Engineers and watershed scientists may 
generally understand that restoration of highly urbanized watersheds costs more than protection 
of sparsely settled areas, but budgeting urban stream restoration projects remains difficult, 
particularly with substantial remaining uncertainties about the effectiveness of treatment 
methods.401 Likewise, economists know that watershed health can bring economic value,402 but 
research on the economic significance of healthy urban streams is minimal.403 One could finesse 
these information gaps by using a crude triaging approach that targets protection efforts to the 
least urbanized areas, where environmental recovery is likely to come at the lowest financial 
cost.404 But that approach involves its own potential paradox: urban areas are usually accessible 
to more people, and there is obvious logic and, potentially, environmental justice behind 
restoring natural environments in the places where large numbers of people actually live, work, 
and recreate.405 To be done well, then, triage may require more information than most watershed 
managers can readily gather.  
 
For a variety of reasons, unbiased decision-makers also may be the exception rather than the 
norm. Collective action and public choice theories provide a partial explanation; stream 
restoration often serves diffuse interests while creating more focused costs, and one might 
reasonably expect those who bear the costs to wield disproportionate influence in the triaging 
process.406 That disproportionate influence is particularly probable if, as is often the case, most 
people are unaware of the ecosystem services that a stream provides, while those bearing the 
impacts are especially accustomed to engaging regulatory processes.407 In many state and local 
government offices, developers, large companies, and other major landowners are a familiar 
presence.408 To the extent that urban watershed impairment creates problems for downstream 
receiving waters, a collective action problem impedes restoration; a community will likely 
realize all of the costs of limiting the downstream migration of pollution, but the benefits may be 
harder to discern unless other communities pursue similar restoration projects.409 Finally, 
psychological tendencies like the endowment effect and the normal human tendency toward 
hyperbolic discounting may distort valuation of restored streams.410 It is easy to undervalue a 
healthy urban stream if you have become accustomed to degradation and if you do not expect to 
see recovery until a five- or ten-year restoration process is complete.411 All of these tendencies 
may help explain why states and local governments have often been so reluctant to engage in 
urban watershed protection—and why Congress and the EPA have traditionally favored legal 
approaches that deny much of the flexibility that systematic triaging would require. 
Counterbalancing such disproportionate interests and tendencies toward inertia may require 
clear, simple, and facially inflexible rules.412  
 
Finally, existing law creates few opportunities for comparative decision-making. In multiple 
ways, the CWA encourages independent decision-making processes for each watershed. Each 
impaired waterway gets its own TMDL.413 The EPA’s use attainability analysis regulations 
anticipate a watershed-by-watershed approach.414 Watershed-based permitting, as envisioned by 
the EPA, provides a mechanism for allocating effort within a watershed, not between 
watersheds.415 The EPA must make some comparative judgments when allocating grant funding, 
and comparative judgments about different sub-watersheds are unavoidable if regulators are 
focusing on a large watershed with multiple tributaries. But existing law otherwise does not 
create processes for weighing the value of restoration efforts in watershed A against efforts in 
watersheds B and C. Nor does it provide a mechanism for downgrading expectations in 
watershed A if work in watersheds B and C would provide greater value. Absent a mechanism 
for making such comparative choices, prioritization could occur through a series of poorly 
informed, ad hoc decisions. 
 
C. Finding Balance 
 
The emerging legal mechanisms for stronger protection of urban watersheds create a quandary. 
Mandating intensive restoration of every impaired watershed in the country, as now seems 
legally possible, is unrealistically ambitious; the aggregate financial costs of restoring literally 
thousands of watersheds would be astronomical and the environmental side effects might be 
serious. But there are reasons to be skeptical about giving state or local governments’ broad 
discretion to pick their spots. Indeed, in practice, state and local governments typically have held 
such discretion, and the common result has been inattention to urban water quality, even when 
some proactive attention might have produced great environmental benefit at little or no cost.  
 
The key question, then, is whether there is some way to introduce greater flexibility into the legal 
system without losing the positive incentives that stringent mandates create. My tentative 
answer—a hypothesis, at this stage416—is that such a mechanism can be developed. While its 
creation likely would require new regulations and administrative guidance, the changes need not 
be drastic, and the overlying statutory structure could remain intact.417 The mechanism would 
involve a basic premise: the EPA would allow a state to downgrade water quality standards for 
small watersheds in highly developed areas if the state could show (1) that present-day uses418 of 
the urban watersheds would not be impaired; (2) that the downgrades would not contribute 
individually or cumulatively to violations of water quality standards in larger receiving waters;419 
(3) that the social cost of fully restoring the urban watershed clearly would outweigh the social 
value; (4) that affected communities had ample opportunity to participate in the downgrade 
decisions; and, crucially, (5) that the downgrades would be balanced by an overall program to 
address landscape-based impacts on water quality across the state. That program would need to 
include more than just vague assurances and hortatory commitments. Instead, the state would 
need to demonstrate the existence of meaningful incentives and enforceable regulatory controls 
sufficient to ensure low-impact development patterns, both on a site-specific and a watershed 
scale; the existence of a monitoring program robust enough to verify the effectiveness of the 
regulatory program; and the presence of enforceable contingency measures or other penalties 
should the monitoring program detect water quality deterioration. The state would need to show, 
in other words, that it was genuinely triaging—that selected urban watersheds were held to a 
lower standard because treatment elsewhere would do greater good and, importantly, would 
actually occur.  
 
Fleshing out this proposal and assessing its viability will require additional research. The key 
overarching question is whether restoration efforts in some watersheds are in fact more valuable 
than efforts in others. If not, triaging is not nearly as essential as the literature currently suggests. 
To answer that question, in turn, requires better understanding of the social and environmental 
values provided by different watersheds; managers and researchers still do not know enough 
about the ways in which communities value small watersheds.420 Nor do we know enough about 
how those values would evolve if urban watershed restoration became a subject of more 
pervasive governmental initiative and public debate.421 Similarly, while watershed scientists and 
engineers know that exurban and rural watersheds cost less to protect, no accepted methodology 
exists for weighing those cost savings against the value of restoring watersheds in densely 
populated areas where, presumably, restoration will benefit more people.422 It seems probable 
that, even within similarly urbanized areas, some watersheds will be easier to restore than others. 
But because there are few case studies of urban watershed restoration, scientists and engineers 
cannot readily discern which urban watersheds could be restored more easily and what degree of 
restoration one might reasonably expect.423 Finally, few studies have rigorously evaluated the 
economic and regulatory incentives created by a legal mandate for urban watershed 
restoration.424 If that mandate primarily deters infill development, triaging is crucially important. 
But if a few expensive cleanups inspire governments or developers elsewhere to prevent 
degradation, inflexibility may be well worth its costs.  
 
The nature of these questions also has implications for the future of urban watershed research. 
None of these questions is purely legal or ecological; indeed, none fits neatly within the bounds 
of any particular discipline. The degradation of urban streams instead creates an unavoidably 
interdisciplinary problem, one that demands expertise not just from physical scientists but also 
from social scientists, engineers, economists, and lawyers. With the combination of a developing 
scientific consensus on the effects of impervious cover and emerging legal levers capable of 
translating that consensus into mandatory obligations, the problem is now urgent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Two hours’ drive south of Long Creek, another watershed stands at the cusp of this 
transformation of the law of urban waterways. The Charles River, unlike Birch Stream or even 
Long Creek, is not the least bit obscure. It is a short river— only eighty miles in length—and its 
watershed, at approximately 308 square miles, is not huge.425 But nearly a million people live in 
that watershed.426 They, and the region’s many visitors, put the river to heavy use: approximately 
20,000 people recreate on or along the river on an average day.427 The river also is an important 
cultural landmark; among other things, it was the start of Paul Revere’s ride, it is the site of one 
of the world’s largest rowing regattas, and it remains the distinguishing feature of the Boston 
landscape. Without exaggeration, the EPA has referred to it as “one of the most historically and 
culturally significant rivers in the United States.”428  
 
The Charles is much cleaner than it once was. For over a century, its pollution was legendary, the 
stuff of pop songs and presidential campaign rhetoric.429 Years of intensive effort—much of it 
devoted to the traditional CWA priorities of controlling industrial discharges and constructing 
sewage treatment plants—have gone a long way toward improving the river’s water quality.430 
But the Charles still falls well short of attaining water-quality standards,431 and, just as in Long 
Creek and in many other urban watersheds, a key cause is the impervious cover associated with 
urbanization of the watershed. In 2008, the EPA invoked residual designation authority and 
declared its intent to require permits for all landowners with an acre or more of impervious 
cover.432 The EPA started small; the initial declaration applies only to four towns in the upper 
watershed.433 But there is no legal or scientific reason why the designation could not be 
expanded to cover the entire watershed.434  
 This nascent regulatory initiative highlights the potential reach of the legal developments 
described in this Article. Though pioneered in small, little-known watersheds, the new 
approaches are grounded in laws that could apply across the urbanized landscape; the 
development patterns of the Charles River watershed are similar to those across much of 
America. The Charles River efforts also illustrate the gravity of the shift. While restoring Long 
Creek will be no small feat, the restoration of a nearly million-person watershed will be an 
extraordinary task. But the Charles River restoration efforts also illustrate the potential benefits 
and the costs of continued indifference to the water quality impacts of development. Ignorance of 
those impacts contributed to chronic water quality violations, many of which might have been 
cheaply ameliorated through some proactive planning, in one of the nation’s most important 
urban waterways. Addressing them, both in the Charles and in many other watersheds, still could 
accelerate the already-ongoing rediscovery of urban watersheds, and, more generally, of the 
potential value of urban environments.435  
 
This Article has argued that the emerging framework for addressing those impacts should be 
reformed in several ways. But even with their flaws, the emergent approaches can start 
redressing environmental problems that have long seemed intractable, and can provide an 
impetus and a starting point for developing an improved legal regime.  
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